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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PAUL BUDDY sT·. CLAIR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
14962 
After a successful appeal to this Court from a prior 
conviction of first degree murder, your appellant was re-
tried for the offense and once again found guilty of murder 
in the first degree. 
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There is no dispute to the fact that your appellant 
killed one Vesta Wittke; Your appellant does not contend 
it to be otherwise. Said the jury : 
"We, the jurors impaneled in the above· cas~ 
find the defendant guilty of the crime of Murder in 
the First Degree as charged in the Information" 
(Tr. 4). 
It would serve no useful purpose to again recite the 
facts leading up to and culminating in the death of the 
victim, of the facts this court [having reviewed the case 
once before] is fully informed. Nor, do we find it necessary 
to seriously take issue with counsel's Statement of Facts 
as made in their Brief on this appeal. We shall make com-
ment hereinafter on both evidence and testimony of the 
witnesses in responding to the issues raised by appellant 
as the case is now presented to this Honorable Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT· I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AS GIVEN BY THE 
COURT V\TAS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF 
THE LAW FREE OF ERROR AND NON-PREJ-
UDICIAL TO APPELLANT'S CAUSE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE APPELLANT'S POCKET 
KNIFE AND THE PORTION OF THE SCREEN 
DOOR. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT PERMIT-
TING SHERIFF GILLETTE TO EXPRESS AN 
OPINION. 
POINT IV. 




INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AS GIVEN BY THE 
COURT WAS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF 
THE LAW FREE OF ERROR AND NON-PREJ-
UDICIAL TO APPELLANT'S CAUSE. 
Appellant complains of the instruction to the jury on 
murder in the second degree, instruction No. 15, which 
was given by the court as follows: 
"You are further instructed that before you 
can find the defendant guilty of murder in the sec-
ond degree, you must believe from the evidence in 
this case and beyond a reasonable doubt the follow-
Ing: 
"First, that on or about the 6th day of July, 
1953, at Tooele County, State of Utah, the defen-
dant killed Vesta Wittke. 
"Second, that the killing was with malice afore-
thought. 
"Third, that the defendant intended to kill 
Vesta Wittke but that he did not deliberate or pre-
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meditate upon the killing, or that the defendant did 
not intend to kill Vesta Wittke but that he did in-
tend to do great bodily harm to Vesta Wittke. 
"Fourth, that the said killing was unlawful. 
"Fifth, that the said killing was felonious. 
"Sixth, that the said Vesta Wittke died within a 
year and a day after the cause of death was admin-
ist~ed. 
"You are further instructed that the burden is 
upon the State to prove to your satisfaction and 
beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the foregoing 
elements of the crime of murder in the second de-
gree are present in this case; and if the State shall 
have failed to so satisfy your minds upon one or 
more of the aforesaid numbered elements, you can-
not find the defendant guilty of murder in the sec-
ond degree, and you should consider whether he is 
guilty of voluntary manslaughter" (R. 390). 
It is appellant's contention that "second degree murder does 
not require premeditation, deliberation, or the specific in-
tent to kill the person killed" and, that, "It is important 
to note that specific intent to kill the· person killed is not 
necessary." Also, appellant complains of the use of the 
words "deliberate" and "premeditate" in the above instruc-
tion. As authority for these propositions appellant relies 
upon State v. Trujillo (1950), 117 Utah 237, 214 P. 2d 
626; State v. Thompson, (1946), 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 
153; and, Sta.te v. Russell, (1944), 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 
2d 1003. 
Of course each case must be decided upon its own and 
singular facts and it is now well recognized in this state 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
that an instruction on second degree murder need not be 
given when the facts of the case or the law itself would 
preclude the jury from such a finding. This Court has said: 
"That it is not error for a court to refuse to 
instruct on second degree murder, where the charge· 
is murder in the first degree, in cas.es where the 
evidence 'vould support only a finding of first de-
gree murder or acquittal, is the settled rule in this 
jurisdiction. See State v. Condit, 101 Utah 558, 125 
P. 2d 801; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 
P. 632, L. R. A. 1916D, 590; and State v. Thorne, 
41 Utah 414, 126 P. 286. The foregoing are cases 
involving killings in the perpetration of a robbery. 
As to included offenses generally, see State v. Angle, 
61 Utah 432, 215 P. 531." 
State v. Matteri, ... Utah ... , 235 P. 2d 325, 
331. 
However, we do not here contend that an instruction on 
second degree murder was not proper in this case against 
Paul Buddy St. Clair; we would contend that the instruc-
tion as given was required. In State v. Matteri, supra, this 
court also said : 
"While intent to kill is not a necessary requi-
site to second degree murder, it may be an import-
ant element if there is absent other elements to raise 
the killing to first degree murder. Could the jury in 
the present case reasonably determine from the 
facts, that there existed an intent to kill and malice 
aforethought and yet be not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the state had made out de-
liberation and premeditation? If they could so rea-
sonably decide upon the circumstantial evidence pre-
sented to them in this case, then there was prejudi-
cial error in this case as in the Trujillo case, in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
failing to include intent to kill as an ele·ment of 
second degree murder." 
It is readily apparent in the case at bar that there could 
have been an "intent to kill with malice aforethought" and 
at the same time the State might not have been able to 
"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was delibera-
tion and premeditation." Had such been the case a verdict 
of guilty of murder in the second degree would have been 
proper; your appellant was entitled to have this question 
resolved. See also State v. Braasch, ... Utah ... , 229 P. 
2d 289, 294 wherein the court discusses State v. Trujillo 
and State v. Matteri, supra. 
In the more recent case of State v. Jensen (Oct. 1951), 
... Utah ... , 236 P. 2d 445, this court stated the rule to be: 
"With respect to his intent: It is the established 
law of this state that in order to make the crime of 
second degree murder the defendant must have in-
tended to either (a) kill, or (h) do great bodily 
harm, or (c) do an act which would naturally and 
probably cause death or great bodily harm to the 
deceased. State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 
2d 153; State v. TrujiUo, Utah, 214 P. 2d 626." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellant's objection to the instruction as given fails in 
merit and even more particularly so when Instruction No. 
1.3 is also considered. 
"You are instructed that under the laws of the 
State of Utah murder is divided into two degrees, 
viz., murder in the first degree and murder in the 
second degree. 
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"So far as is applicable to this case, every kill-
ing of a human being which is wilful, deliberate, 
malicious, and premeditated is murder in the first 
degree. 
"In order to make a case of murder in the first 
degree, there must not only be an intention to kill, 
but there must also he a deliberate and premeditated 
design to kill. Such design must precede the killing 
by some appreciable space of time, but the time need 
not be long. It must be sufficient for some reflec-
tion and consideration upon the matter, for a choice 
to kill or not to kill, and for the formation of a 
definite purpose to kill; and when the time is suffi-
cient for this, it matters not how brief it is; and 
whether a deliberate and premeditated design to 
kill was formed must be determined from all the 
circumstances of the case. 
"Murder in the second degree is the unlawful 
killing of a human being with malice aforethought 
when death results in either of the following cases: 
"1. When the killing is intentionally done, but 
is not deliberate or premeditated; or 
"2. When the defendant did not intend to kill 
the deceased, but when he did intend to do great 
bodily harm to the deceased" (R. 388, 389). 
This instruction made crystal clear to the jury the elements 
of difference between first and second degree murder. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE APPELLANT'S POCKET 
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KNIFE AND T·HE PORTION OF THE SCREEN 
DOOR. 
It was the State's theory of the case that your appel-
lant gained entry into the victim's home by cutting through 
the screen of the locked back door and unlatching the screen 
door (R. 127). Appellant had a pocket knife on his person 
when he was taken into custody by the sheriff after the 
shooting (R. 247). Appellant admitted that the pocket 
knife [entered into evidence without objection, (R. 248)] 
was his knife and that he had had it for several years (R. 
344). The State failed to conclusively prove and the de-
fense failed to conclusively disprove that this knife was 
used to cut the screen on the door. Appellant here contends 
that there was no proper "connecting up" between the knife 
and the screen door so as to permit the knife to be put in 
evidence. Appellant cites no authority for this contention, 
but merely states that it was "prejudicial to defendant's 
rights because the Court's comments on the evide:nce cer-
tainly misled the jury." (Emphasis ours.) We think ap-
pellant places the comment of the Court, to which they 
take exception, out of context. 
Thus speaks the record: 
"MR. F ARR : Your Honor, one thing on the 
knife. May we have what the F. B. I. said about the 
knife read into the record, please? That is what we 
were stipulating to. 
"THE COURT: Well, I thought you had agreed 
that he would say he had checked the knife and the 
screen, and there was no metal such as in the screen 
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to be found on the blades of the knife. 
"MR. F ARR: Excuse me. No sir. 
"MR. ANDERSON: No identifying marks that 
can be traced from the knife to the screen, metal 
or otherwise. 
"THE COURT: Well, you would hardly expect 
the harder blade of a knife to leave a part of its 
metal on soft copper wire. I would think you would 
look for the soft metal on the hard metal. 
"MR. ANDERSON: Well-
"THE COURT: You can see-
"MR. F ARR : May it please the Court, may 
we read what the F. B. I. would have said? 
"THE COURT: Is that true? 
"MR. F ARR: I understood that was the stipu-
lation. This paragraph of it. 
"MR ANDERSON: I have no objection to that, 
Your Honor. 
"T'HE COURT: Then read it. 
"MR ANDERSON: This paragraph, if he wants 
it. 
"THE COURT: Let Mr. Farr read it into the 
record then. 
"MR F ARR : Reading now from a report of the 
F. B. I. Laboratory, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Washington, D. C., dated July 17, 1953, to Mr. Fay 
Gillette, Sheriff of Tooele County, Tooele, Utah, and 
quoting from one of the paragraphs in said letter, 
the following: 
" 'No foreign deposits of metal or paint were 
found on the blades or in the blade recesses of the 
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pocket knife, specimen Q-7, which could be identi-
fied as having come from the section of screen, 
specimen K-2. None of the individual cut strands 
of wire in the screen contain tool markings suitable 
for identification purposes. It was not possible, 
therefore, to associate by tool marking comparisons 
the knife, Q-7, as the tool used to cut the submitted 
screen, K-2.' 
"MR. ANDERSON: That's fine. 
"MR. F ARR: Thank you." 
Counsel were attempting to stipulate to what the findings 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were, pertaining to 
the knife blade and the screen. Thereafter the report itself 
was read into evidence; the remark of the court added 
nothing to nor detracted nothing from the findings of the 
F. B. I. Those findings were simply that (a) no foreign 
deposits of metal or paint were found on the blades of the 
knife or in the blade recesses which could be· identified as 
having come from the section of screen; (b) none of the 
cut strands of wire in the screen contained tool marks suit-
able for identification purposes. It was not possible, there-
fore, to associate by tool marking comparisons the knife 
as the tool used to cut the screen. How could these findings 
prejudice the appellant's case when it was his affirmative 
contention that he did not cut the screen but merely opened 
the door to gain entry (R. 333). The Court's remark was 
not a comment on the evidence, as might be inferred from 
appellant's statement in the brief, and the remark was 
made before the findings of the F. B. I. were placed in 
evidence, not after. 
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Appellant complains that the screen from the door was 
improperly admitted into evidence on two grounds: 
"First, there was no evidence or testimony that 
the defendant's knife was used to cut the screen 
door. 
"Second, there was no testimony or evidence 
that would establish that the screen door was cut 
from the outside or that the defendant may have 
cut it." 
We would concede that there was no direct evidence adduced 
by the testimony to establish the fact that the screen door 
was cut by defendant's knife. No witness testified to seeing 
the screen cut. There was testimony to the fact that the 
screen had been cut. Patricia Wittke said she hooked the 
latch on the screen just before she went to bed and that 
the screen was at that time undamaged; (R. 154-5) that 
she examined the screen door after the shooting and there 
was a cut in the screen door (R. 155). Dayton Wittke said 
there was no cut in the screen door on July 5, 1953 but 
that he observed such a cut at daylight of the next day (R. 
188-9). The sheriff testified that there was a cut in the 
screen door; (R. 240-1-2) the sheriff investigated the doors 
and observed the cut shortly after his arrival at the Wittke 
home (R. 260) ; that the direction to which the wire was 
turned was toward the outside (R. 262). The appellant 
testified as follows: 
"Q. Now, Mr. St. Clair, how did you get in 
that back door on the night or early morning of 
July 6, 1953? 
"A. I just walked in. 
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"Q. Did you cut the screen? 
"A. No sir. 
''Q. Was the screen locked? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Did you hear Pat testify that she locked 
the screen? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. When she went to bed? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. Did you open the screen? 
"A. With the handle, yes. 
"Q. With the handle? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And you testify that it was open at the 
time you came there? 
"A. It was unlocked. I didn't say it was open. 
"Q. Well, all right, unlocked. It opened at your 
pull. Is that correct? 
"A. Yes." 
The evidence was conflicting as to how the appellant se-
cured entrance to the Wittke home, it presented to the jury 
a question of fact; the weight and sufficiency thereof was 
for the jury, the Court did not err in admitting the screen 
in evidence. It was not such evidence as should be excluded 
under the rule stated in 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law, Sec. 600, 
page 922 as contended for by appellant, the opening sen-
tence in said section, quoted by appellant, to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT PERMIT-
TING SHERIFF GILLETTE TO EXPRESS AN 
OPINION. 
The sheriff was. called to the Wittke home on the night 
of July 3rd (R. 232) ; St. Clair had had an altercation with 
the deceased in the kitchen of her home and in which 
Dayton Wittke joined as a participant. St. Clair was struck 
with a poker and sustained injuries on and about the head 
including a laceration of the scalp. St. Clair told the sheriff 
that night that "he was going to get even with that little 
s-o-b Dayton and that there would be a pay day for Vesta" 
(R. 234). At this trial the following occurred during cross 
examination of the sheriff : 
"Q. Was anything said about filing a com-
plaint while you were at the home, the Wittke home? 
"A. I don't remember whether there was any-
thing said there. There may-there was some angry 
words, and I don't recall just what they were, but 
when he-on the way back I told him if he felt that 
he should have a complaint that he would talk to 
the county attorney. 
"Q. Now, these words that you took as threats, 
did you consider them as threats at that time? 
"A. Well, he was angry and hurt, apparently 
hurt, and intoxicated, so I just figured that maybe 
they would ease up later on. Sometimes they do. 
"Q. Did you-what did you take those words 
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''THE COURT: I wonder-excuse me just a 
moment, Mr. Gillette. I wonder if that would help 
the jury as to what this witness took them to mean. 
I don't mean to make objections for you, but I am 
wondering if what he assumed it would mean would 
be of any help to the jury. Wouldn't it be for the 
jury to assume what was meant? 
"MR. BAGLEY: I think Your Honor is right 
on that. I withdraw that question. (Emphasis 
added.) 
"Q. These statements were made in the same 
conversation where he was talking about filing a 
complaint for assault and battery, were they not? 
"A. I think they were made prior. I think 
that is the reason I told him that he could sign a 
complaint if this-
"Q. But it was all in the same general conver-
sation? 
"A. Yes, it was. 
Appellant contends that the sheriff should have been per-
mitted to tell the jury what he, the sheriff, took those words 
to mean at the time they were spoken-presumably the 
words-"he [St. Clair] was going to get even with that 
little s-o-b Dayton and that there would be a pay day for 
Vesta." Appellant says : "If the words conveyed the im-
pression to Gillette that St. Clair was not serious about the 
'threats,' then this \vould lessen the weight of other testi-
mony given as to the premeditation and deliberation on the 
part of the accused." Possibly so, if the sheriff were to 
reply, "I think he was only fooling;" definitely not so if 
the sheriff had been permitted to reply "I took those words 
as meaning that St. Clair intended to get even with that 
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little s-o-b Dayton and then have a pay day for Vesta." In 
either event the witness would have been invading the 
province of the jury who are charged with the responsibility 
of determining the ultimate facts. The general rule is: 
"It is a fundamental princi pie of the law of 
evidence, as administered by our courts, that testi-
mony of witnesses upon matters within the scope of 
the common knowledge and experience of mankind, 
given upon the trial of a cause, must be confined to 
statements of concrete facts within the witness' own 
observation, knowledge, and recollection, that is, 
facts perceived by the use of his own senses, as 
distinguished from his opinions, inferences, impres-
sions, or conclusions drawn fron1 such facts. This, 
of course, governs the admissions of opinion evi-
dence in homicide cases. * * *" 
26 Am. J ur. Hon1icide, Sec. 432. 
The rule is stated this way in C. J. S.: 
"In the law of evidence, 'opinion' is an infer-
ence or conclusion drawn by a witness. from facts, 
some of which are known to him and others as-
sumed, or drawn from facts, which, although lending 
probability to the inference, do not evolve it by a 
process of absolutely necessary reasoning. 
"Under ordinary circumstances a witness in 
testifying is to be restricted to facts within his per-
sonal knowledge, and his opinion or conclusion with 
respect to matters in issue or relevant to the issue 
may not be received in evidence. * * *" 
32 C. J". S. Evidence, Sec. 438. 
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In a civil cause the Supreme Court of Utah had this to say, 
in 1921: 
"* * * some of the witnesses were permit-
ted merely to state their conclusions or inferences. 
This was also improper. It sometimes is not im-
proper for a witness to give his conclusion from 
what he heard and saw and observed where he can-
not fully explain all that he heard and saw because 
it involved more than merely verbal statements, pro-
vided he states all that he heard and saw and gives 
the circumstances fully. Under such circumstances 
the witness, although a layman, may sometimes and 
under certain circumstances state his conclusion or 
his impression. This is permitted, however, only 
twhen there is no other method of arriving at the 
true situation or condition of things." 
Rockefeller v. Industrial Commission, . . . U. 
. . . , 197 P. 1038. (Emphasis added.) 
It would be perfectly proper for the witness to state any 
facts known to him which would serve to throw light on 
the meaning of the words spoken, but it must be left to the 
jury to draw the inferences with the light afforded by such 
facts. 
Appellant says, further, that: "In any event it was 
the duty of the district attorney to object and not the 
courts." The rule as to the admissibility of opinion evidence 
is, as stated in 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, Sec. 771: 
"The general rule excluding opinions of wit-
nesses is simple in statement, but not so simple in 
application, for it is not always easy to distinguish 
in the testimony of a witness facts within his knowl-
edge or observation from his opinions on facts. As 
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a general rule, a witness may testify directly to a 
composite fact, although in a sense his testimony 
may include his conclusion from other facts. In the 
multitudinous affairs of everyday life, it is extreme-
ly difficult to distinguish between 'opinion' on the 
one hand and 'fact' or 'knowledge' on the other. 
Moreover, objections that proposed testimony states 
a conclusion only are sometimes pushed to captious 
extremes. The true solution seems to be that such 
questions are left for the practic·al discretion of the 
trial court. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
/ 
This Court has said: 
"* * * whether there is sufficient founda-
tion for the expression of an opinion by the lay wit-
ness or whether such opinion would be helpful to 
the jury rests almost altogether in the judicial dis-
cretion of the trial judge." 
In re Hanson's Estate, 87 U. 580, 52 P. 2d 1103, 
1116. 
The Court properly exercised its judicial discretion here and 
in all probability avoided cause for reversible error had the 
witness been permitted to respond to the question. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT. 
The well established rule in this jurisdiction is that in 
capital cases the entire proceeding will be reviewed to de-
termine whether there be error even though it be not as-
signed nor argued; State v. Stenbeck, 78 U. 350, 2 P. 2d 
1050, 79 A. L. R. 878; State v. Russell, supra; State v. 
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Matteri, supra; State v. St. Clair, · 3 U. 2d 230, 282 P. 2d 
323. Therefore this Court will have the onerous task of 
reviewing the record of the proceeding in its entirety in 
this the second trial of Paul Buddy St. Clair for the murder 
of Vesta Wittke. The writer has carefully studied the rec-
ord and proceedings and can only conclude therefrom that 
the irregularities found to have taken place in the previous 
trial of this cause were herein avoided and, in the writer's 
opinion, there appears no reversible error in the present 
record. We must so contend. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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